Relay identification is necessary in many cooperative communication applications such as detecting the presence of malicious relays for communication security, selecting the intended relays for signal forwarding, and tracing a specific relay. However, this identification task becomes extremely challenging for amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying systems since AF relays usually have no capability of adopting traditional identification methods implemented above the physical layer. This paper proposes a physical-layer AF relay identification scheme based on the exploitation of the device-specific in-phase and quadrature-phase imbalance (IQI) feature. Given that IQI estimation is mandatory in most present receivers for compensation, it is cost-effective to make use of these estimation results for fingerprinting AF relays. A generalized likelihood ratio test-based fingerprint differentiation technique is adopted to detect the minor difference between two range-limited IQI fingerprints. Using this differentiation technique, a whitelist-based identification algorithm consisting of fingerprint registration, update, and identification is proposed. Furthermore, the optimal training signals that lead to the maximal detection probability are derived for the typical quadrature amplitude modulation and phase-shift keying modulation schemes. The simulation results validate our derivations and confirm that the proposed method can accurately identify AF relays.
cases, relay identification is necessary either to detect the malicious relay nodes or to classify those intended relays. In addition, the applications of relay identification can be extended to wireless device localization and tracking [7, 8] .
Although a cross-layer decode-and-forward relay identification was investigated in [8] , this method cannot be applied to amplify-and-forward (AF) relay identification since AF nodes only work in the physical layer without any content modifications to the forwarded signals. This implies that all existing upper-layer identification methods are not applicable to the case of AF relaying, thus resulting in the need to fingerprint AF relays in the physical layer. It has been reported that a wireless transmitter can be identified by its unique hardware imperfections [9, 10] . At the transmitter side, all transmitted signals are inevitably affected by the device-specific RF front-end impairments. At the receiver side, both channel and RF imperfection estimations are usually mandatory for signal reception, and thus it is cost-effective to use these estimation results for wireless transmitter identification.
Related work
As a typical RF imperfection, transmitting (Tx) IQI has been studied for fingerprinting wireless transmitters [11] [12] [13] . The authors of [11] studied Tx IQI measurements of a large group of transmitters and concluded that IQI can uniquely represent the identity of a wireless transmitter. In [12] , IQI fingerprinting was experimentally validated in the scenario of multiple 802.11n multipleinput multiple-output transmitters. The authors of [13] proposed a distance test (DT) method in which the Euclid distance between two Tx IQI fingerprints is used for device differentiation.
However, most current methods, including [11] [12] [13] , are not suitable for AF relay identification. Unlike the regular transmitters, an AF must receive signals before the signal retransmission process. Given this fact, both receiving (Rx) and Tx IQI need to be taken into account in fingerprinting AF relays [14, 15] . The authors of [16, 17] proposed a varying fingerprint (VF) comprising both channel gain component and Tx/Rx IQI parameter component, where only the IQI parameter is useful for relay identification. However, the performance of using VF is inadequate in the case of small IQI values. In practice, the manufacturing market requires that the hardware-level imperfections (e.g., IQI parameter) must be small and within a limited range [18] [19] [20] . Due to the inevitable channel variation and estimation noise, the uniqueness, stability, and distinguishability of such small IQI parameters are remarkably weakened, thereby leading to degraded identification accuracy. To address these problems, an enhanced AF relay fingerprinting approach and high accuracy fingerprint differentiation technique with optimal performance design are urgently necessary.
Our methods and contributions
This paper proposes an accurate AF relay identification method using physical-layer IQI-based fingerprinting without the aid of any upper-layer identification technique. We consider small IQI values in a dual-hop AF relaying system in which the source node transmits signals to the destination node via an AF relay. Based on existing Rx/Tx IQI estimation results, we propose an improved AF relay fingerprint without channel gains interleaving compared to the VF fingerprinting method. This new fingerprint is used in our whitelist-based fingerprint registration and identification algorithms for relay identification. Moreover, we propose a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT)-based fingerprint differentiation technique and optimal signal designs to further improve the fingerprint identification accuracy under small IQI values. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose a new fingerprint of AF relay and analyze its dynamic range and features in order to reveal the main technical challenges in relay identification small IQI values. These general analysis results can also be useful in other IQI-related AF relaying performance studies.
• An accurate GLRT-based AF relay identification algorithm is proposed. The numerical results demonstrate that the introduced identification algorithm outperforms other identification methods [13, 17] in terms of distinguishing delicate IQI fingerprint differences, even with fewer symbols.
• Optimal and suboptimal training signals for quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) and phase-shift keying (PSK) modulations are designed to maximize the capability of detecting an intended AF relay.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the system model of our IQI-based AF relay identification. In Section 3, the features of IQI fingerprint are analyzed. A GLRT-based fingerprint differentiation technique is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the fingerprint registration, identification, and update algorithms are described. In Section 6, the optimal and suboptimal signal designs are presented. Section 7 presents the numerical results and discussions. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section 8.
Notations:
and (·)
H denote conjugate, expectation, absolute value, transpose, and conjugate transpose operations, respectively. Bold lowercase and uppercase letters represent vectors and matrices, respectively. For vector a, we use a k to show its kth element. I denotes the identity matrix. det(A) is the determinant of matrix A. {x} and {x} denote the real part and imaginary part of x, respectively.
System model
This section mainly describes the system model for the AF relay's IQI fingerprint, the dual-hop AF relaying system, and the whitelist-based AF relay identification scheme. Finally, the objective of this study is presented.
IQI fingerprint model for AF relay
In an AF relay, all signal processing is accomplished in the physical layer. Specifically, the in-band received signal is down-converted, amplified, up-converted, and finally forwarded toward the destination node [14, 21] . We thus model the AF relay as the cascade of an Rx component, an amplifier, and a Tx component, as shown in Fig. 1 . We consider the asymmetric IQI model [15, 22] in which the signal is affected by the Rx/Tx gain imbalance α rx /α tx and the Rx/Tx phase-shift imbalance θ rx /θ tx . Since the frequency-dependent IQI plays a minor role compared to the dominant effect caused by the frequency-independent IQI [23] , the former is not considered in this model. After the imperfect RF front-end, the passband signal y p (t) = y(t)e jωt is forwarded to the destination, where y(t) denotes the baseband equivalent signal as
where
and
is the baseband signal of the input x p (t) = x(t)e jωt . In this paper, g 1 and g 2 are the joint Tx/Rx IQI parameters and play the role of fingerprinting AF relays. Since IQI is a stable hardware feature, it can be steady in a time scale much longer than an identification session [24] . Hence, we consider that g 1 and g 2 are constants in the identification procedure. In addition, all of the following analyses are considered in the baseband domain.
System model for dual-hop AF relaying
We consider a dual-hop AF relay system consisting of a source node (S), an AF relay node (R), and a destination node (D). It is assumed that S, R, and D are equipped with a single antenna and operate in half-duplex mode. Thus, S first transmits the signal to R in the first phase, and then, R re-transmits the amplified signal to D in the second phase. It is considered that D can only receive signals via R. The two individual channels S-R and R-D experience independent block fading so that the instantaneous complex channel gains h SR and h RD are independent and fixed for a block [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . n SR and n RD represent the receiving noises at R and D, which are circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variables as n SR ∼ CN 0, σ 2 1 and n RD ∼ CN 0, σ 2 2 . As shown in Fig. 2 , D is able to identify R through analyzing g 1 and g 2 , which are extracted from the received signals. To avoid additional implementation costs, our identification method makes use of the channel and IQI estimation results, where such estimations are usually mandatory in most present receivers (i.e., D). Thus, we assume that D has the knowledge of h SR and h RD before performing the proposed identification method. Similar to [15] , we consider the IQI-free S and D and focus on the IQI caused by the AF relays since it plays the important role of fingerprinting AF relays. Given that the IQI estimation is usually carried out using training signals, we consider the training signals in our identification method. In the S-R phase, an N × 1 training symbol block s is transmitted from S to relay R. The kth received symbol at R can be represented as
where s k is the k-th transmitted symbol and has the aver-
In the R-D phase, using (1) and (4), the received Tx/Rx IQI distorted signal at D is
The LS estimator, as a typical IQI estimator [19, 23] , is then employed to estimate the IQI vector g, which can be given bŷ
where the estimation error is
It is noteworthy that the Bayesian estimator is not suitable for our study since g is an unknown constant instead of a random variable. Fig. 2 illustrates our whitelist-based AF relay identification based on the IQI estimation results [30] . We first whitelist the valid IQI fingerprints using the proposed fingerprint registration. After that, once a new relay tries to communicate with the destination node, the relay identification can be accomplished by comparing this new relay's fingerprint with the pre-registered fingerprints.
Whitelist-based AF relay identification
Our objective is to achieve accurate AF relay identification even with small IQI values through analyzing g.
Device fingerprinting analysis
In this section, we analyze the important fingerprint (i.e., g 1 and g 2 ) to reveal the technical challenges in accurately identifying AF relays with small IQI values.
Fingerprint range analysis
Applying Euler's formula to (2) and (3), we get
Without the loss of generality, the ranges of amplitude and phase-shift imbalances are assumed to be |θ tx | θ m1 , |θ rx | θ m2 , |α tx | α m1 , and |α rx | α m2 . The ranges of {g 1 }, {g 1 }, {g 2 } and {g 2 } can be derived as
, and θ max = θ m1 + θ m2 . To see the individual effect of amplitude imbalance and phase-shift imbalance on g 1 and g 2 , we can set α min = α max = 1 to remove the amplitude imbalance, while set θ max = 0 to remove the phase shift imbalance in (10) . It is notable that we consider a = 1 in g 1 and g 2 in this study. For the cases a = 1, we can use g 1 /a and g 2 /a to replace g 1 and g 2 in our analysis. As reported in [31] , the realistic IQI can result in an image rejection ratio down to 20-40 dB, which is equivalent to |θ rx/tx | 14.4212 • , |α rx/tx | 0.22. This is consistent with the IQI values used in [13, 19, 32] . Therefore, we reasonably define (5 • < θ m1 , θ m2 < 14.5 • , 0.05 < α m1 , α m2 < 0.22) as the large IQI case, define (0 < θ m1 , θ m2 < 5 • , 0 < α m1 , α m2 < 0.05) as the small IQI case in our study, and give the numerical ranges of {g 1 }, {g 1 }, {g 2 }, and {g 2 } in Table 1 .
Signal-to-IQI-distortion ratio analysis
To mathematically represent the relative amount of g 1 and g 2 , the signal-to-IQI-distortion ratio (defined in [18] ) of our system is given by
The range of γ is further derived as where
The infinity in (12) denotes the IQI-free case.
Proof See Appendix 1.
Challenges of identifying small and range-limited fingerprints
Substituting the large IQI and small IQI in (12), we obtain 10 log 10 (γ ) ∈ [ 11.142 dB, ∞) and [ 14.854 dB, ∞), respectively, which implies that g 2 is always much less than g 1 . Table 1 and the numerical result of (12) indicate that the ranges of {g 1 }, {g 1 }, {g 2 }, and {g 2 } are extremely limited in small IQI case, which holds that {g 1 } ≈ 1, and {g 1 }, {g 2 }, {g 2 } ≈ 0 [18-20, 33, 34] . Therefore, the accurate detection of the differences between such rangelimited IQI fingerprints g in the presence of estimation error term (i.e., n g ) becomes further difficult.
In the following, we propose GLRT-based fingerprint differentiation technique and optimal signal designs to handle this challenging AF relay identification.
Generalized likelihood ratio test-based fingerprint differentiation
In this section, GLRT is applied to decide whether a fingerprint belongs to a pre-registered AF relay or not. We assume thatĝ v = g v + n v is one of the preregistered valid fingerprints, where g v denotes the actual value of this IQI fingerprint, and n v denotes the estimation error. Since hardware-level IQI fingerprints are stable, the amount of n v can be significantly reduced based on enough samples in the fingerprint registration phase, such as by using equal-gain combining, maximal-ratio combining, or selection combining techniques [16] . The fingerprint comparison betweenĝ LS andĝ v is
A binary hypothesis testing can be modeled by
where hypothesis H 0 means that the two compared fingerprints belong to the same AF relay, implying that g = g v . Otherwise, hypothesis H 1 is accepted. According to Appendix 2, the elements of n can be modeled as CSCG variables. Therefore, their linear combination n g is CSCG as well. The mean vector and covariance matrix of g off can be given by
where σ 2 is the variance of n g , and 
Given that g off is a zero-mean and non-zero mean complex normal vector under H 0 and H 1 , respectively, the likelihood functions of g off under H 0 and H 1 can be given by [35] 
where g = 0 in Eq. (21) . Due to the presence of noise in (13), g is not directly available. We apply the GLRT ( [36] , eq. 6.12) to determine
where η is a real positive number. According to (21) , the numerator of (22) is maximized when the exponential argument (g off − g) H −1 (g off − g) is minimized. Since and −1 are positive definite matrices, we have x H −1 x 0 for any x and the equality holds if and only if x = 0 ([37], Definition 1-(i)). Hence, g = g off maximizes the numerator of (22), and produces the logarithmic GLRT as
If A is larger than the threshold T, hypothesis H 1 is supported. Otherwise, H 0 is supported. We use NeymanPearson lemma [36, Theorem 3.1] to determine the best T with a given false alarm probability by solving the following equation
where p A (·|H 0 ) denotes the probability density function (PDF) of A under H 0 , and P FA is the false alarm probability. Appendix 3 shows that the PDFs of A under hypotheses H 0 and H 1 are
where I 1 (·) is the first order modified Bessel function of the first kind ( [38] , eq. 9.6.19). The parameter β in (26) is defined as
where λ 1 and λ 2 are the eigenvalues of −1 , b 1 and b 2 are the elements of b that can be given by
where Q is a 2 × 2 matrix whose i-th column is the eigenvector of −1 corresponding to λ i , i = 1, 2, and satisfies QQ H = I. Substituting (25) into (24), P FA can be obtained as
and T for a given false alarm rate can be calculated by solving (29) .
Finally, the detection probability for this fingerprint comparison can be derived as
, eq. 4.59), and
Based on our fingerprint registration process (see Algorithm 1), v = 4 − 2 − 3 1 and 1 = 4 , 2 = * 3 . In most practical cases, it can be observed from (19) that the effect of v in can nearly vanish when large Z is used, which means 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ≈ 0. Hence, P D can be further simplified as
. By using (32) instead of (30), we are able to quickly calculate the instantaneous detection probability for every fingerprint comparison, which may enable the timely adjustment of T in (23) for ensuring the desired detection performance. In summary, using the GLRT presented in (22) and (23), two fingerprints can be differentiated with the detection probability derived in (30) given a given false alarm rate. In practical implementation, the detection probability can be quickly computed using (32) instead of (30).
Whitelist-based AF relay identification algorithm
Based on our above derived results, this section presents the AF relay identification algorithm consisting of the fingerprint registration, update, and identification.
Fingerprint registration
We consider that a new relay, R AF , joins in the network. The fingerprint of R AF (i.e.,ĝ v,U ) needs to be extracted and stored in the whitelist. As shown in Algorithm 1, the average of the Z estimated IQI fingerprint is used to improve the accuracy of the registered fingerprint. Then,ĝ v,U is registered as the U-th valid fingerprint in the whitelist.
Algorithm 1 Fingerprint registration algorithm
1: for i ← 1 to Z do 2: S sends s to D via R AF 3:
Extractĝ LS,i of R AF using (7). 4 
Fingerprint identification and update
If this R AF is not claimed as a newly joined relay, the fingerprint identification algorithm should be executed to verify its identity. In some practical applications, such as an authentication application, R AF may actively claim its identity, which can be indexed to one of the valid fingerprints in the whitelist. In this case, we only need to compare the estimated fingerprint of R AF (i.e.,ĝ LS ) with the claimed fingerprint. Without the loss of generality, we assume that R AF does not claim its identity. As presented in Algorithm 2, the proposed GLRT-based differentiation is performed to compare R AF 'sĝ LS with all U pre-recorded G v one-by-one, which leads to three possible cases:
Case #1 (l = 0): R AF is not identified as any candidate in the whitelist, implying all U GLRT claim H 1 . Case #2 (l = 1): R AF is identified as one candidate, implying that only one GLRT claims H 0 . Case #3 (l > 1): There are a number of l candidates that have the similar fingerprints to R AF .
To handle Case #3, we use the maximum likelihood (ML) technique and choose the relay with its A j closest to 1 as the final decision, since that A = 1 can lead to the ML in (25) . If R AF is not identified, alarm is set to 1 to give an alarm. Otherwise, the R AF 's identity is obtained in ID.
In addition, although stable in the time scales of hours and days, the hardware fingerprint may slowly change over time, and thus, it may have the chance to affect the identification performance. In fact, it is practically impossible to model and predict the random minor changes of our fingerprint in a short time duration. As reported in [24] , it may take up to 30 days to observe the distinguishable hardware changes, which is usually unnecessary to be taken into account in our short time identification. In our case, it is more efficient to consider the fingerprint update by taking the advantage of every signal reception since our IQI fingerprint can be extracted from any relayed signals. As shown in line 22 of Algorithm 2, after identifying R AF , Algorithm 1 can be optionally used to update the R AF 's fingerprint in the whitelist. Moreover, the fingerprint registration can be periodically executed if needed, for example, after receiving a certain number of signals.
Algorithm 2 Fingerprint identification and update algorithm
1: Initialization: l ← 0, d min ← 0, k ← 0 and idx ← {0}. 2: Extractĝ LS of R AF using (7). 3: Calculate for R AF using (16). 4: for i ← 1 to U do %U GLRT exams 5: Compareĝ LS withĝ v,i in G v to obtain g off using (13). 6 :
Set a required P FA in (29) and calculate T.
8:
Compare A i with T to determine the true hypothesis using (23).
9:
if H 0 is claimed then 10 :
end if 12: end for 13: if l = 0 then %Case #1 14: alarm ← 1 %give an alarm 15 : else if l = 1 then %Case #2 16: k ← idx 1 , ID ←ĝ v,k , alarm ← 0 17: else %Case #3 18: Find j that satisfies min(|A j − 1|), j = 1, · · · , l 19: k ← idx j , ID ←ĝ v,k , alarm ← 0 20: end if 21: if alarm = 0 then % update fingerprint 22: Algorithm 1 can be optionally executed for updatinĝ g v,k in G v 23: end if
Optimal signal design for maximizing identification performance
Unlike the easily programmable upper-layer identities (e.g., medium access control address) or fast varying channel-based characteristics, IQI is fixed on the hardware level for a relatively long period. Therefore, once the presence of a relay's IQI fingerprint is detected, this fingerprint can be used as pre-knowledge associated with this relay for a period. This enables us to design the best signal for intentionally detecting this relay again with a maximized detection probability in the future, which is useful in many practical applications. Taking authentication as an example, we assume that a malicious AF relay R is detected by an authentication, and its fingerprint is thereby stored. In practice, this R can repeatedly attempt to impersonate other legitimate relays through changing its upper-layer identity. Given the stability of IQI, the already stored fingerprint of R can be used as known in Eq. (13) to obtain g off and the pre-knowledge of g can be obtained as well according to our previous GLRT analysis.
With this pre-knowledge, we are able to derive the optimal s i to intentionally maximize the detection probability for the future authentication of R . We first assume that the g associated with an intended AF relay is known. In (30), the two arguments of P D are β and T, where the value of T is to hold a fixed false alarm, thus implying P D can only be maximized by adjusting β in practice. According to [40] , P D is a strictly increasing function with respect to β. Thus, maximizing P D is equivalent to maximizing β = 2 g H ( g + v ) −1 g > 0 through adjusting s i . However, the mathematical expression of v is unavailable in general as it is only dependent on the specific sample processing method of the past fingerprint registration phase. Hence, the adjustment of s i cannot affect v . In practice, v always approaches a null matrix with the proper diversity-combining techniques and enough samples, as discussed in Eq. (32) . Also, using Lemma 1 below, we get g H −1 
Lemma 1 Given two N × N positive definite Hermitian matrices U and V, and a N × 1 complex vector x, the following inequality holds
Proof See Appendix 4.
Using (16), (27) , (28), and setting = diag(λ 1 , λ 2 ), we can get
where h 1 = h SR h RD and h 2 = h * SR h RD . It can be observed that maximizing β is also equivalent to maximizing J for a given σ 2 . Since s i is subject to the specific constellation patterns, QAM and PSK as two basic modulation schemes are considered in deriving the optimal s i .
QAM modulation case
In QAM modulation, the signal can be represented as
where J i is defined as
Since s i are independent, we are able to separately design s i to maximize J i , which leads to the maximal J. The rule of optimal signal design under QAM modulations is summarized in Proposition 1. In our optimal design, the value of the optimal symbol only has two options when d > 0 or d < 0. This may occasionally result in a singular matrix H H s H s that makes the matrix inversion difficult, e.g., the calculation of −1 . For practical implementation purpose, we give a more robust suboptimal signal design as follows:
If d > 0 or d < 0, the suboptimal signals are the two constellation points that are the closest to the optimal signal. Figure 3a shows the optimal symbols (red) and suboptimal symbols (green) in a 64-QAM constellation. It is noteworthy that the optimal and suboptimal symbols are not required to be located in the same quadrant. For instance, if d < 0, an optimal symbol has been chosen from the first quadrant, while the suboptimal symbol can be either in the first or the third quadrant.
PSK modulation case
For a general M-PSK modulation, the constellation diagram is a circle such that the signal can be represented by s i = A s e jθ i , where A s denotes the constant signal amplitude and θ i denotes the phase-shift. The rule of optimal signal design for PSK is proposed in Proposition 2. 
Proof See Appendix 6.
Since φ can be any degree, whereas the values of θ i are subject to the specific PSK constellation diagram, we need to choose the M-PSK symbol having the closest angle to θ i as the optimal s i in practice.
Similarly, we also propose a suboptimal design to solve the problem of a singular matrix, H H s H s . Since the degree of derived −φ is twice that of θ i , we first create a M 2 -PSK constellation. As shown in Fig. 3b , P k denotes the square of the kth constellation point of M-PSK, i.e., P k = s 2 k = A 2 s e j2θ k . As shown in this newly defined Without the loss of generality, it is assumed that −φ is closer to P k than P k−1 and P k+1 , which means that it falls in one of the sectors of A 1 , A 2 (red sectors), A 3 , or A 4 (gray sectors). Herein, we take a combination of two signals (s i , s i+1 ) into account to approach the desired phase −φ and accordingly present the rules of suboptimal approach as follows:
In practical implementation, Proposition 1/2 can be first considered to design the optimal QAM/PSK signals. Then, a portion of them can be flexibly replaced by applying the suboptimal approaches.
Numerical results
In this section, numerical results are presented to validate our derivations and evaluate the performance of the proposed IQI-based AF relay identification method. 
Numerical results for IQI device fingerprint
The dynamic range of the IQI device fingerprints and the parameter γ derived in Section 3 are first evaluated. (8) and (9) . In addition, these 4 simulated parameters' ranges also validate our analytical results derived in (10) . Figure 5 depicts 10 log 10 γ in terms of α. The figure shows that the peak values of all four simulated 10 log 10 γ appear at α = 1, which is the case of the absence of phase-shift imbalance. It is shown that the black curve (θ rx = θ tx = 0 • ) can go to infinity when α = 1, thus confirming the result of the infinity case in Eq. (12) . We then substitute α = 0.64 − 1.44 in (12) to calculate the lower limit of 10 log 10 γ . As expected, the calculated analytical results (11.9032 dB, 12.5637 dB, 12.8595 dB, and 13.1708 dB) can match the simulated results.
The above numerical results confirm our IQI fingerprint derivations in Eq. (8)- (12) . 
Performance evaluation of proposed AF relay identification
In Fig. 6 , the detection probability P D in terms of the false alarm probability P FA is shown. It can be seen that the analytical P D calculated by Eq. (30) is well confirmed by the simulation results. Threshold T, which is calculated by solving (29), decreases with P FA varying from 10 −3 to 1.
In Fig. 7 , P D for different instantaneous channel gains h SR and h RD is evaluated. We set a fixed T for holding P FA = 5%, and randomly choose a fixed fingerprint offset g =[ 0.0306 + j0.0669 − 0.0186 − j0.0712] T , fixed s and noise variance σ 2 = 0.1 to ensure constant γ 1 and γ 2 . We consider h SR ∼ CN(0, w SR ) and h RD ∼ CN(0, w RD ) to respectively generate h SR and h RD , where w RD = ww SR , In Fig. 8 , P D using the optimal signal described in Propositions 1 and 2 is compared with the suboptimal and non-optimal signals. We substitute the optimal signal derived by Propositions 1 and 2 into (30) to obtain the analytically maximal P D , and call it the upper bound. The non-optimal signals are randomly chosen symbols. The results show that our suboptimal methods have a detection probability loss of only 2.59% and 1.68% on average in QAM and PSK, respectively, compared to the optimal methods. On the other hand, our suboptimal methods also show on average a 34.54% and 23.43% higher P D than the non-optimal cases. Therefore, the suboptimal solution is capable of significantly improving the identification performance in the small IQI condition, and furthermore it can be more robust than the optimal solution. At last, the performance of the identification algorithm is evaluated. Specifically, the algorithm can either choose the correct identity from the four pre-registered candidates for the relay under test or give a timely alarm if the relay is not identified. The aforementioned DT [13] and VF methods [17] are simulated and compared. The correct identification rate (CIR) is defined as the ratio of the number of correct identity claims and correct alarms to the total number of identification attempts. Figure 9 shows the CIR performance vs. SNR. Since the estimation error n g is reducing with the increase of SNR, the detection accuracy and CIR go higher. It can also be seen that our method is superior to the VF and DT schemes in all simulated cases. Compared to VF, our fingerprint removes most effects of the channel variation, and thus, the uniqueness and stability of our fingerprint are improved. Regarding DT, the distance between different fingerprints g is usually too short to differentiate due to the limited range of IQI, as discussed in Section 3. Meanwhile, in our method, the proposed GLRT-based differentiation and optimal signal designs can significantly improve the accuracy in differentiating minor g. Additionally, our identification can achieve better performance but use fewer training symbols. For instance, it can be seen that the CIR of our method with N = 32 and P FA = 1% is even higher than VF with N = 512 and P FA = 1%, which also implies lower Tx power consumption by using our method.
Conclusion
A physical-layer AF relay identification scheme was proposed to accurately identify relays based on the examination of their unique IQIs. Since IQI estimation and compensation are usually mandatory in most present wireless receivers, we direct use the LS estimation results to generate the IQI fingerprint of an AF relay node. Comprehensive analyses including the features of this IQI fingerprint, the probabilities of detection and false alarm in differentiating between two relays with small IQI values, and whitelist-based relay identification algorithms were presented. In addition, we proposed optimal and suboptimal training signal designs for the purpose of maximizing the detection probability. The simulation results validated our analytical results and showed that the proposed identification method could accurately identify AF relays even under the small IQI condition. From (11), it is found that the ideal IQI-free condition, i.e., θ m1 = θ m2 = 0, α m1 = α m2 = 0, can result in a zero denominator and a real positive numerator. In this case, γ is positive infinity. We then summarize the derivations for the minimum value of γ as an optimization problem, which is given by arg min α,θ tx ,θ rx 1 + α 2 + 2α cos(θ tx − θ rx ) 1 + α 2 − 2α cos(θ tx + θ rx ) ,
s.t. α = (1 + α tx )(1 + α rx ), |θ tx | θ m1 , |θ rx | θ m2 ,
Using the constraints in (37b), the range of α can be determined as Note that both the numerator and denominator are divided by α cos θ tx cos θ rx in deriving (39) . This is reasonable as the practical amplitude mismatch and phase mismatch are small enough to ensure α > 0 and cos θ tx cos θ rx > 0. According to the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means [43] , we can obtain
where (1−α m2 ) . It is notable that the monotonicity of α + 1 α is considered in (40) to find its upper bound. Further, we can also refer to the monotonicity of cosine and tangent, and get cos θ m1 cos θ m2 cos θ tx cos θ rx 1,
− tan θ m1 tan θ m2 tan θ tx tan θ rx tan θ m1 tan θ m2 . (42) Based on (40)- (42), the lower bound of (39) 
Consequently, the range of γ can be obtained as shown in (12) .
